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General Notes on Homestead

Author johnbsims3

#1 - Posted: 22 Oct 2006 06:28 
General Notes on Homestead

The affidavit is required by law to make the claim, and power of attorney is legally sufficient.

The declaration does not constitute being used as a shield to any fraud or egregious conduct. The burden is on the objecting party to show that party claiming the exemption is not entitled to it. In re Sanders, 72 B.R. 124 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1987). A party objecting to the exemption claimed under Florida law must prove, by preponderance of evidence, that the claimant is not entitled to the claimed exemption.

Involuntary absence is not sufficient to support a finding of abandonment. Dean v. Heimbach, 409 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Under Florida law, homestead rights are construed in favor of exemption. Under Florida law, a natural person loses his constitutional homestead exemption only if one of the three specific and expressly stated exemptions is present, or if the person uses his homestead as instrument of fraud. While Florida's constitutional homestead exemption is designed for honest claimants, it is generally assumed that the claimant is honest unless and until the contrary is proven. Colwell v. Royal Intern. Trading Corp., 226 B.R. 714 (S.D. Fla, Miami Division).

Once homestead status is acquired, it continues until the homestead is abandoned or alienated in a manner provided by law. A homeowner retains a homestead interest in his home, notwithstanding any criminal or dissolution judgment. Cain v. Cain, 549 So.2d 1161 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1989). Continued ownership of the residence and the record should reflect neither alienation of interest nor intent to establish a homestead elsewhere. If not, the evidence needs to get in the record ASAP. See Dean v. Heimbach, 409 So.2d 157, which is a controlling case.

When homestead status has been acquired, it continues until the homestead is abandoned, which is normally evidenced by establishment of domicile at some other place, or alienated in a manner provided by law. Under Florida law, the intent to establish homestead is evidenced by specific acts toward creating a permanent abode which are not contradicted by any subsequent behavior. Intent coupled with actual use are all that is required to make the written legal claim. Establishing homestead status under Florida law requires actual use and occupancy of property; however, continuous, uninterrupted presence is not required. M.O. Logue Sod Service, Inc. v. Logue, 422 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Daily residence is not essential to create or maintain a "homestead", nor is it disrupted by temporary absence with the intent to return. Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443. You do not have to occupy the premises 24 X 7.

Although an involuntary nature of absence from property claimed as homestead under Florida law is an important factor to consider, a homeowner sufficiently occupies the property to establish homestead status under Florida law if this is where he "hangs his hat", even though he spends the current bulk of his time living away from property and his involuntary absence from property is required or even to defend and serve time for a criminal or civil suit. Compliance with the "intention coupled with actual use" requirement is sufficient.

The requirement regarding legal abandonment, which boils down to two issues, is voluntarily moving to a new residence and claiming it as homestead, and/or rental of the property for profit.

A homestead has been "abandoned" when it is no longer a bona fide home and place of permanent abode. Law v. Law, 738 So.2d 522, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1924. Temporary absence from a homestead will not deprive it of its homestead character, unless there is a design of permanent abandonment. Only permanent abandonment of a homestead deprives the property of its homestead character. Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867.

As more than one court has indicated, the Florida Constitution grants "a liberal exemption" for homestead property. Englander v. Mills (In re Englander), 95 F.3d 1028, 1031 (11th Cir. 1996); In re McClain, 281 B.R. 769 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002). In Florida, a homestead is established when there is "actual intent to live permanently in a place, coupled with actual use and occupancy." In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994). Ultimately, all that is required to make the claim is that the property owner reside on the property and in good faith make the same his permanent home. Colwell, 226 B.R. at 719; see also Judd v. Schooley, 158 So.2d 514, 516 (Fla. 1963). Exceptions to the homestead exemption should be strictly construed in favor of claimants and against challengers. In re Ehnle, 124 B.R. 361, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). One's homestead or domicile is a rather simple equation in the end: residence plus intent to remain. As mentioned, the exceptions to the homestead exemption are to be "strictly construed" in favor of its claimants, and the Court can only conclude on the evidence before it, or lack thereof, that an owner resides in the property and "in good faith" intends it to be his permanent home.

Regarding the Partridge case, the entire issue is a mis-representation of the facts. The appellant's claim in the Partridge case was without merit and it was reversed. The appeals court only affirmed the contesting of subject matter jurisdiction in that opinion. What happened there was that the trial court granted a motion for summary final judgment, finding that the appellant only paid alimony arrearages when forced to pay through incarceration and that his "failure to pay alimony while expending sums of money for other purchases were done with the intent to defraud the former wife." Accordingly, the trial court authorized foreclosure on her equitable lien due to the apparent fraud. The trial court supposedly and correctly, under the facts of the trial, entered the final summary judgment in that case because the record contained evidence of the appellant's fraudulent and egregious conduct such that the fraud exception to the homestead exemption possibly applied under an equitable lien. The homestead can be the subject of an equitable lien and foreclosure by a forced sale in an appropriate case of fraud or egregious conduct.

The facts in the Partridge case show that wife had failed to receive her money, not because of husband's conduct, but because of her inability to prove that he can pay it. The court stated "We decline to hold that, because a husband possesses qualified homestead real property which he refuses to alienate or mortgage to meet support obligations, he has acted "reprehensibly" as a matter of law so as to overcome the constitutional protection against the forced sale of such property. Id. at 1311; see also Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(forced sale of homestead property was permitted where the former husband attempted to use the homestead exemption as an instrument to defraud his former wife and to escape his honest debt to her); cf., Radin v. Radin, 593 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)(the court imposed an equitable lien on homestead property due to the former husband's egregious conduct, but a forced sale was not ordered)."

Regarding Greene v. Bush, that case was also reversed and remanded. The adopted order from a hearing officer contained no findings of fact to support the recital that the appellee "has had and does have the ability to have paid and to pay" the support previously ordered by the court. With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law in that case, it appeared that the trial court was troubled by the contemplation in the recommended order that personal property be sold to generate funds to pay the purge. However, Bowen 471 So.2d at 1279 provides: "In determining whether the contemnor possesses the ability to pay the purge amount, the trial court is not limited to the amount of cash immediately available to the contemnor; rather, the court may look to all assets from which the amount might be obtained."

In the Anderson case, the father of the children, in asserting a claim of homestead exemption fought to defeat the very purpose for which the Constitution provided homestead exemption, that is, he was seeking to defeat the support of his two children claimed to be his dependents, and the courts generally do not permit such conduct. See the case of Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So.2d 253, holding that in the decree of divorce the court could properly charge the home owned by husband and wife as an estate by entirely with the obligation of the husband to support his wife and minor children. In the Anderson case the judge had retained jurisdiction with regard to the entireties property and had the power, upon proper suit, to charge the interest of the husband in the former entireties homestead with the obligation to support his minor children and to order partition of the property, and the judgment that the plaintiff recover past due support money and that execution issue therefor was proper and valid. Yes, the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of protecting the family home and those whom it was designed to protect. See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S416, S417 (Fla. June 21, 2000)(citing Milton v. Milton, 58 So. 718, 719 (Fla. 1912)); Myers, 671 So. 2d at 866; Cain, 549 So. 2d at 1163, but can only be defeated through an affirmative finding of fraud or egregious conduct. At the same time, it has been held that exceptions to the exemptions should be strictly construed.

In Gepfrich, the appeal was on the trial court's order holding that the former husband shall pay alimony arrearages to the former wife, and that he shall sell his home, with the proceeds from the sale to be applied toward the arrearages. The trial court ruling implied that the husband had purchased his home and was asserting the homestead exemption for the sole purpose of defeating the former wife's attempt to enforce his obligation to pay her alimony. The homestead law did not protect the former husband from a forced sale to pay alimony arrearages because he was found to be affirmatively engaged in fraud. The former husband bought the house after the dissolution, lived with his girlfriend, supported his girlfriend, and was found after a proper trial, to be attempting to defraud former wife. According to the order, the trial court expressly found that it was incomprehensible that the husband could support his lady friend, who made no meaningful contribution to the support and maintenance of his expensive and luxurious home, but could not support his former spouse and minor child. The trial court also expressly found that the husband's defenses to his former wife's motion for contempt constituted a complete lack of "clean hands." Thus, it was clear from that case that the trial court did not intend to sanction a situation where a former husband invested his consolidated assets into an expensive and luxurious home, lived in the home with his girlfriend, maintained her and the house, and cried poverty to avoid paying his alimony obligations to his former wife. I, and the court certainly agree that this trial court should not sanction such a blatantly defrauding scheme by permitting any former husband to hide behind the homestead exemption laws in any situation, which is in no way related to your case to my knowledge. The court should not create the imposition of an equitable lien, because everyone is innocent of any wrongdoing until proven otherwise.

In Trammel, a civil forfeiture action was brought against real and personal property allegedly used in connection with drug offenses. The homestead guarantee does not prohibit forfeiture of homestead property when proceeds in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act are invested in or used to purchase property. The court ordered the homestead forfeited on the grounds that the proceeds of illegal activity were used for its purchase and to hide the illegal money, which is one of the only exceptions outside of the statute, and is based again on the fraud issue.

In Graham v. Azar, 204 So.2d 193, Fla. 1967 the court had to decide whether the head of a Florida family can claim a constitutional homestead exemption against a money judgment for child support recovered by a former wife. The law was finally settled in that case. The rule of the decisions Mr. Baron cited is not dispositive of the case before the court in this matter. I'd like to hear Jay and Marian's comment on this if possible, and go to the hearing to listen.

It is apparent that where equity demands it, the courts have not hesitated to permit equitable liens to be imposed on homesteads beyond the literal language of the constitution. However, the court should not be so concerned with the constitutional language as it should be with its belief that an equitable lien could not be imposed because Carlos is not a party to any fraud until proven. In other cases, there was no fraud involved (See La Mar or Sonneman) In those cases, the equitable liens were imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. Moreover, in both cases the homestead interest of the spouse of the party whose conduct led to the unjust enrichment was also subject to the equitable lien. It may be true, as contended by the wife, that this case is based upon some direct, immediate, willful and flagrant fraud; however, it is not for the lawyer Mr. Baron, to decide that. The authority for the proposition that a lien might arise which may be enforced against the homestead, even though it is not in specific terms included in the constitutional provision, is well settled.

As for the equitable lien, there is certainly some evidence from which a court might begin to justifiably compare his conduct to Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So.2d 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (forced sale of man's homestead proper where it was used to defraud former spouse and avoid payment of marital judgment debt to her). Here, however, the court did not make any finding that the husband is using the newly acquired homestead itself as an "instrument of fraud" or as a means to escape his support obligation to his wife. While the trial court expressly relied on Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), this record lacks the particularized evidence and findings detailed there, except perhaps for an "adamant" refusal to produce the financial information the court had several times ordered produced. On remand, to reconsider the imposition of an equitable lien, the court may receive additional evidence and should make specific findings.

Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So.2d 375 (Fla.1978)(homestead should be protected against forced sale when possible, but not at expense of others owning interest in property, so where forced sale is only way former wife can enjoy beneficial enjoyment of her undivided one half interest in property, partition is appropriate).

The attorney(s) may have to move for declatory judgment on the validity of the claim, then move for trial on the fraud or egregious conduct issue in order to foreclose on any equitable lien. If there is no competent and substantial evidence to support a finding that a homeowner is engaged in fraud or egregious conduct in order to avoid his obligations, he stands in no worse position than he stood before and his claim will stand.

Although this is lengthy, I hope this helps. I can supply plenty more authority if required.


Author johnbsims3

#2 - Posted: 23 Oct 2006 14:54 
The homestead exemption is not dependent on an interpretation of the property involved or of the debtor's title to the property. The Constitution does not expressly require the owner or his family to occupy the place claimed as a homestead. However, the word "homestead" implies occupancy as the home place. Consequently, in order that the claim of homestead be sustained, the disputed premises must be occupied as a homestead by the claimant as his actual residence.

The fact that a debtor had never filed a tax return in the United States was not sufficient to demonstrate that the debtor did not live in the home in question for purposes of the homestead exemption.
The mere fact of filing a declaration of homestead, as prescribed by statute, does not of itself impress on the disputed premises the quality of homestead, and does not take the place of occupation of the property. It is necessary that the claimant first occupy the premises as a home.

A taxpayer must reside on the property on January 1 of the relevant tax year in order to satisfy the requirements of Article VII, section 6, Florida Constitution, and section 196.031, Florida Statutes, which authorize the tax exemption for qualified homestead property. However, Florida courts have held that the physical presence of the owner is not a requirement of either the Florida Constitution or the statute. 1997 Atty Gen Op 97-19.

Ultimately, all that is required to establish a homestead under Florida law is that property owner reside on property and, in good faith, make property his permanent home. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. X, 4. In re Prestwood, 322 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).

Under Florida law, homestead is established when there is actual intent to live permanently in a place, coupled with actual use and occupancy. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, 4.

Ultimately, all that is required to establish a homestead under Florida law is that property owner reside on property and, in good faith, make property his permanent home. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, 4.

Exceptions to Florida homestead exemption should be strictly construed in favor of claimants and against challengers. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, 4.

In order to be entitled to the homestead exemption, continuous, uninterrupted residence is not required.[FN13] Although daily residence is not essential,[FN14] a homestead right does not extend to property that the claimant has not occupied as a dwelling place or home.[FN15]

A debtor was allowed to claim the homestead exemption, where he financed the property, took care of the taxes on the property, and lived on the property while he was in Florida, even though the debtor did not occupy the premises continually.[FN16]


Debtor was entitled to Florida homestead exemption in condominium which he purchased and in which he began to live nearly three years prior to his Chapter 7 filing, notwithstanding suspicious circumstances surrounding transfer of his California residence to company owned by his brother, that debtor worked for Internet-related company based in California and routinely traveled back to California for his job, that most of debtor's mail went to "mail drop" in California, that debtor's bankruptcy petition showed a California mailing address, and that, prior to petition date, debtor did not have Florida bank account or own car registered in Florida; at some point well before filing of Chapter 7 petition, debtor was living in Florida condominium, and his wife testified that, but for attempt at marital reconciliation, she thought that he would still be living in Florida at time of hearing on trustee's objection to Florida homestead exemption. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. X, 4. In re Prestwood, 322 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).

Continuous uninterrupted physical presence is not required to create a homestead. Novoa v. Amerisource Corp., 860 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2003).

[FN13] In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
[FN14] Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So. 2d 443 (1942).
[FN15] Hussa v. Hussa, 65 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1953).
[FN16] In re Frederick, 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995), determination sustained, (May 18, 1995).
It frequently happens that a homesteader may own two separate pieces of property within the state, both of which he may occupy at intervals. It is a general principle, however, that there must be an intention to reside on the property as a permanent place of residence before a claim of homestead rights therein may be sustained.[FN17] And it seems clear that the claimant cannot have two permanent residences at the same time, the designation of one property as the home being a question of fact.[FN18] If it is shown that the owner has ceased to occupy the disputed premises and has established his residence elsewhere, he may not successfully claim a homestead right therein.[FN19]

[FN17] 39.
[FN18] McGregor v. Kellum, 50 Fla. 581, 50 Fla. 589, 39 So. 697 (1905).
[FN19] McGregor v. Kellum, 50 Fla. 581, 50 Fla. 589, 39 So. 697 (1905).
In addition to the element of occupancy of the property claimed as a homestead,[FN21] the courts require an intention to reside on it as a permanent place of residence.[FN22] Actual use and occupancy coupled with the intent to remain in the home are key qualifications for purposes of the homestead exemption.[FN23] In order to show an intent to establish a homestead, the debtor must demonstrate specific acts toward creating a permanent abode, which acts are not refuted by later behavior.[FN24] "Permanency," when used in this sense, means the presence of the intention to reside at the particular place for an indefinite period of time, and not a conclusive intent to remain there forever.[FN25] And there must be a present intention of occupying it as a homestead, manifested by an open visible act by which the intention of the owner may be apparent to others.[FN26] However, a house would be considered a debtor's homestead, where the debtor intended to reside in the house permanently and where he actually used the house as a residence, even though the debtor and his former wife were trying to sell the house and even though the debtor stored personal possessions elsewhere.[FN29] Similarly, debtors would be entitled to a homestead exemption, even though they spent three nights in their rented apartment between the closing and permanent occupation of their new home, as the debtors transferred some of their possessions to the new house and cleaned and fixed up the new premises during this time and as the debtors clearly intended to leave the rented apartment, which could not be claimed as a homestead.[FN30] Likewise, a debtor was allowed to claim the homestead exemption where he held a proprietary lease to a cooperative apartment unit which ran in perpetuity, where the debtor intended to and actually did occupy the premises as his residence, where he listed the address of the premises on his driver's license, and where the debtor did not own any other residence.[FN31]

[FN21] 36, 37.
[FN22] Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So. 2d 448 (1943); Miller v. West Palm Beach Atlantic Nat. Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940).
[FN23] In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re McCarthy, 13 B.R. 389 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig, 652 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
[FN24] In re Wilbur, 206 B.R. 1002 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), related reference, 1997 WL 375687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), related reference, 211 B.R. 98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), related reference, 217 B.R. 314 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
[FN25] Engel v. Engel, 97 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1957).
[FN26] First Nat. Bank v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, 145 So. 177 (1932).
[FN29] In re Wilbur, 206 B.R. 1002 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), related reference, 1997 WL 375687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), related reference, 211 B.R. 98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), related reference, 217 B.R. 314 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
[FN30] In re Krueger, 90 B.R. 553 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
[FN31] In re Dean, 177 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).

Author Yvette

#3 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 11:05 
I own my home, its my primary resident, its homestead, have my important mail going there, driv. license, check books, utilities under my name etc.....but I stay alot at my boyfriends house..I have a cousin that was living with me at my home...which was ok for hime since I was always at my boyfriends...one day I found him doing something he should have not in my home, I asked my cousin to leave. He left mad. He was not paying rent either, he would write me checks each month b/c I let him borrow money so he was paying me back. I'm helping a good friend of mine now, she moved in to my home, not paying rent either. My cousin states he's going to call the property appraisals office to let them know that I'm not at my home 3 days a week etc..or hardly there so they get remove my homestead. Is there a Florida law or stipulation that I have to be at my primary home certain number of days etc...or I lose my homestead or its not considered my primary b/c I'm at my boyfriends ? Your help is appreciated.

Author johnbsims3

#4 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 11:41 
NO! Extended absence for any reason is not considered abandonment of the homestead. Do a search on this BBS on 'extended absence' or 'travel' for more detailed information. New state laws give the homeowner the upper edge, and the Property Appraiser the burden of proof. As long as the property is not rented (i.e., you have a rental agreement) there is no abandonment of homestead. Let me know if this helps...

Author Yvette

#5 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 13:50 
Thanks great to know...thanks so much...
When you say do a search on BBS (what does BBS mean?).

Thanks again for your fast response.

Author Yvette

#6 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 13:51 
Oops, I figured it out....thanks again...

Author johnbsims3

#7 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 13:52 
It means do a search on this Bulletin Board. Above at the top of this page, you will see a 'search' link. Click on it and enter your search terms...

Author johnbsims3

#8 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 13:57 

Author Yvette

#9 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 14:02 
Yes, I did that...thanks again. I love this website and your quick responses and acknowledge...I'm so happy I found this site...

Author johnbsims3

#10 - Posted: 17 Nov 2009 14:05 
THANK YOU! Check out our company website at http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

Let us know if we can help you in any way. Please spread the word about us and...Have a great day!

Author bdgmdmba

#11 - Posted: 21 Nov 2009 04:50 
I've owned my house in Florida for 22 years but for the last 4 years have been there for only 1 month a year. I permit my brother to stay there to take care of the place and pick up my mail (no rent).

FL: All the bills for my FL house are in my name; I've continuously had a drivers license in Florida for 20 years; voters registration for 20 years, claimed it as my residence with IRS for 20 years; bank accounts for 20 years; important paperwork and belongings in the house; important mail, licenses, permits mailed to the house.

AZ: I have another house in Arizona and am there about 6 months a year; my wife worked there for 5 years with her mother and out daughter living in the house. I've never worked in AZ, never declared a residency there, never voted there, get no real estate tax deduction even though my wife declares her residency at the AZ house. Neither of us live in the house now, and it is for sale.

The appraiser in FL decided that I do not qualify for homestead anymore, and also for the previous 4 years. Past taxes and penalties were sent to me, and they doubled the assessed value of my house. To contest it, they wanted my wife's income tax returns. (We've always filed separately, with her as head of household in AZ).

The preliminary magistrate sided with the appraiser. I'll be appealing. Am I in the right?

Author johnbsims3

#12 - Posted: 21 Nov 2009 06:44 - Edited by: johnbsims3 

You are in the right. PA's office's are notorious for completely ignoring the law. They desperately want that revenue. You are more than likely the Head of the Family and your wife's issue has no bearing on the fact that you never legally abandoned your FL property nor claimed homestead in another state or on another property from your dissertation...
Who represented you? Hope this helps.

Author bdgmdmba

#13 - Posted: 21 Nov 2009 07:23 
Thanks John.
A lawyer that handle's my deceased father's trust said that I should have no problem in front of the magistrate (informal hearing with the PA present with all those contesting revocation of homestead). So I went myself with all the documentation. The PA lied about homestead exemptions in Arizona (none) and the magistrate seemed to harp on the fact that I was around only a month a year. This is in Escambia County, Pensacola. Got any suggestions?

Author johnbsims3

#14 - Posted: 21 Nov 2009 07:30 
Search this BBS for evidence to submit and use in your appeal brief. We don't have anyone in Pensacola, but I wll try to help in any way possible. Show that the PA lied! Show that the PA does not know the law! It's all right here at your fingertips.

You can use our declaration as hard evidence under oath. No rebuttal will thwart that! E-mail me at myhomestead@bellsouth.net

Good luck !

Author narreng9

#15 - Posted: 16 Nov 2012 23:31 
Florida homestead exemption in condominium which he purchased and in which he began to live nearly three years prior to his Chapter 7 filing, notwithstanding suspicious circumstances surrounding transfer of his California residence to company owned by his brother, that debtor worked for Internet-related company based in California and routinely traveled back to California for his job.......

Author johnbsims3

#16 - Posted: 17 Nov 2012 06:01 
Narreng9 - Your question is...?

Basics About Exemptions Florida Homestead Services -- Florida Homestead Exemption Act MiniBB / Basics About Exemptions /
General Notes on Homestead
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