2 Questions , How to employ Contest of Lein?..and...

Hi ,
I got the Homested Declaration from you a few years ago and it was a great investment.

Questions:

1.Who do I send "contest of lein" forms to , if I get a lein. Do I send one certified to the Code enforcement or do I file it with the county clerk? serve it in person get a reciept? ...Help?

2. If I succesfully Contest the Lein and my Home is safe from forced sale to satisfy a code enforcement lien, can code enforcement proceed to confiscate other personal property ( vehicle, etc...) to satisfy thier lein ? Or does their lein only attach to the property in violation of thier "code"

Thanks and it is a great service you are providing

JESUS IS LORD

The Conest of Lien goes to the Code Enforcement board and a copy should be filed in the public record. Certified Return Reciept is sufficient. Code Enforcement cannot confiscate any property to satisfy thier lien. A code enforcement lien CANNOT, I repeat CANNOT be foreclosed against a homestead. Do a search on this BBS and you will find the case law.

Fla. Stat 162.09 (3) A certified copy of an order imposing a fine, or a fine plus repair costs, may be recorded in the public records and thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator. Upon petition to the circuit court, such order shall be enforceable in the same manner as a court judgment by the sheriffs of this state, including execution and levy against the personal property of the violator, but such order shall not be deemed to be a court judgment except for enforcement purposes. A fine imposed pursuant to this part shall continue to accrue until the violator comes into compliance or until judgment is rendered in a suit filed pursuant to this section, whichever occurs first. A lien arising from a fine imposed pursuant to this section runs in favor of the local governing body, and the local governing body may execute a satisfaction or release of lien entered pursuant to this section. After 3 months from the filing of any such lien which remains unpaid, the enforcement board may authorize the local governing body attorney to foreclose on the lien or to sue to recover a money judgment for the amount of the lien plus accrued interest. No lien created pursuant to the provisions of this part may be foreclosed on real property which is a homestead under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution. The money judgment provisions of this section shall not apply to real property or personal property which is covered under s. 4(a), Art. X of the State Constitution.

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

Exemptions

If owners sold homestead property after county recorded order imposing fine, no lien would then exist in hands of purchasers; however, if owners failed to invest proceeds of that sale into another homestead within reasonable period of time, those proceeds could be reached by creditors, and if owners retained ownership but abandoned property as homestead, order against them could be enforced as lien. Demura v. County of Volusia, App. 5 Dist., 618 So.2d 754 (1993). Homestead 76; Homestead 105

No lien created pursuant to administrative fine can exist as to homestead property. Demura v. County of Volusia, App. 5 Dist., 618 So.2d 754 (1993). Homestead 105

Mere recording by county of order imposing fine could not constitute cloud against title to homestead, and thus suit to quiet title on property claimed as homestead would not lie; appropriate action for property owners seeking to avoid cloud on title was declaratory judgment action seeking determination that property was in fact homestead property, if this point were in dispute. Demura v. County of Volusia, App. 5 Dist., 618 So.2d 754 (1993). Quieting Title 7(1)

Lien created under § 162.09, for administrative fine ordered by code enforcement board, is unenforceable against homestead property for foreclosure if owner successfully asserts homestead status as defense; such lien is neither tax nor assessment within exceptions to Const. Art. 10, § 4(a)'s rule of homestead exemption from forced sale. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 85-26, March 26, 1985.

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

Mere recording of code enforcement board order, requiring owner to alleviate code violations pertaining to his homestead property or be subject to a fine, as a lien in the public records did not constitute a cloud upon owner's homestead property; however, if owner's property somehow lost its homestead status, city would be able to enforce the order as a lien against the property. Miskin v. City of Fort Lauderdale, App. 4 Dist., 661 So.2d 415 (1995). Homestead 105

Constitutional prohibition against forced sale of homestead did not invalidate lien, but merely rendered the same unenforceable where city recorded code enforcement board's order, requiring owner to alleviate code violations pertaining to his homestead property or be subject to a fine, as a lien in the public records. Miskin v. City of Fort Lauderdale, App. 4 Dist., 661 So.2d 415 (1995). Homestead 105

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

Number: AGO 85-26
Date: March 26, 1985
Subject: Unenforceable lien against homestead property
Mr. Thomas V. Infantino
City Attorney
City of Inverness
405A Courthouse Square
Inverness, Florida 32650

Dear Mr. Infantino:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on substantially the following question:

WHETHER A LIEN CREATED PURSUANT TO s 162.09, F.S., IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST HOMESTEAD PROPERTY.

You state that the City of Inverness is considering the adoption of an ordinance creating a code enforcement board pursuant to Ch. 162, F.S., and that questions have arisen as to the ability of the city through its code enforcement board to enforce orders it may enter against a parcel of property which enjoys the protective umbrella of the homestead exemption where 'an administrative fine imposed by the Board is uncollectable by conventional means such as execution and levy, garnishment, attachment, etc.' You further state the question presented as whether a lien imposed pursuant to s 162.09, F.S., 'rises to the status of liens imposed for taxes or assessments, or . . . merely place[s] the code enforcement board in the shoes of any other judgment creditor.' This opinion is therefore expressly limited to a consideration of the issue as framed by your inquiry and concerns only the status of liens created pursuant to s 162.09, F.S.

Chapter 162, F.S., authorizes local governing bodies to create an 'administrative' code enforcement board 'to provide an equitable, expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method of enforcing the technical codes in force in counties and municipalities, including, but not limited to, occupational license, fire, building, zoning, and sign codes.' See, s 162.02, F.S. The code enforcement board is empowered to hold hearings when a violation of an applicable code continues beyond the time specified by the code inspector for correction. See, ss 162.06 and 162.07, F.S. The board further has the power to '[i]ssue orders having the force of law to command whatever steps are necessary to bring a violation into compliance.' Section 162.08, F.S. See also, AGO 84-55 (Chapter 162 authorizes creation of quasi-judicial administrative boards for purposes of administrative enforcement procedures and imposition of administrative fines); AGO 85-17. Section 162.09, F.S., provides as follows:

Administrative fines; liens.--The enforcement board, upon notification by the code inspector that a previous order of the enforcement board has not been complied with by the set time, may order the violator to pay a fine not to exceed $250 for each day the violation continues past the date set for compliance. A certified copy of an order imposing a fine may be recorded in the public records and thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists or, if the violator does not own the land, upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator; and it may be enforced in the same manner as a court judgment by the sheriffs of this state, including levy against the personal property, but shall not be deemed to be a court judgment except for enforcement purposes. After 1 year from the filing of any such lien which remains unpaid, the enforcement board may authorize the local governing body attorney to foreclose on the lien. (e.s.)

Section 4(a), Art. X, State Const., provides as follows:
There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.

(e.s.)

This exempting language is broad and comprehensive, clear and specific. Graham v. Azar, 204 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1967). When considering this section the courts have consistently held that this exemption provision should be liberally construed, Graham v. Azar, supra; Olesky v. Nicholas, 82 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1955), while exceptions to the exemptions should be strictly construed. Graham v. Azar, supra; Wilhelm v. Locklar, 35 So. 6 (Fla. 1903). The Florida constitutional exemption of homesteads protects the homestead against every type of claim and judgment except those specifically mentioned in the constitutional provision itself. Olesky v. Nicholas, supra. But see, Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925), holding that the homestead exemption cannot be employed as a shield and defense after fraudulently imposing on others where the facts showed embezzled funds were used to make improvements to the embezzler's homestead property. Cf., Op. Atty. Gen., August 7, 1940, Biennial Report of the Attorney General, 1939-1940, p. 521 (homestead property subject to forced sale in payment of excise tax on whiskey, citing to statutory language establishing such payment as an excise tax collectible as any excise tax imposed by the state and noting that the constitutional homestead exemption was never intended to be used as a cloak for such 'reprehensible activities'). However, the prohibition of the constitutional provision is a prohibition against the use of process to force a sale of homestead property and does not invalidate the debt or the lien but rather takes priority over the debt or lien. Milton v. Milton, 58 So. 718 (Fla. 1912); Point East One Condominium Corporation, Inc. v. Point East Developers, Inc., 348 So.2d 32 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1977).

Therefore, the issue as presented by your inquiry is whether a lien created pursuant to s 162.09, F.S., is within a strict construction of the constitutional provision excepting liens 'for the payment of taxes and assessments' from the homestead exemption from forced sale. A 'tax' is a forced burden or charge, an imposition or contribution assessed by some reasonable rule of apportionment on persons or property. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Lakeland, 115 So. 669 (Fla. 1927); Hiers v. Mitchell, 116 So. 81 (Fla. 1928). A 'tax' has been further defined as a charge on persons or property to raise money for public purposes, or the payment of public expenses in support of governmental activities. Smith v. Lummus, 6 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1942); Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 117 So. 385 (Fla. 1928). A special or local assessment for public improvements is a charge against particular property with reference to the peculiar and specific benefit to such property by reason of the improvements. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Gainesville, 91 So. 118, 122 (Fla. 1922). An assessment should not exceed the benefits accruing to the properties improved. City of Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1968).

Section 162.09, F.S., authorizes a duly created code enforcement board to 'order [a] violator to pay a fine not to exceed $250 for each day the violation continues past the date set for compliance.' The title to the section indicates that such fine is an 'administrative fine,' and the statutory language itself states that an unpaid fine shall constitute a lien enforceable 'in the same manner as a court judgment' which may be foreclosed upon after one year from the filing of such lien. The statute does not specify that such fine shall be collectible as a tax, cf., Op. Atty. Gen., August 7, 1940, Biennial Report of the Attorney General, 1939-1940, nor does it appear that such fine is an imposition or contribution assessed by some reasonable rule of apportionment on persons or property, or that such fine is a charge against particular property with reference to any peculiar and specific benefit to such property by reason of some public improvement. Moreover, it would not appear that the imposition of such fine could be said to fall within the rule of Jones v. Carpenter, supra, in which the facts of the case led the court to conclude that the constitutional exemption of homestead from forced sale could not be used as a shield and defense after fraudulent imposition on creditors. Thus, in the absence of any judicial precedent on this matter, I am of the view that such fine is not a tax or assessment within the meaning of the pertinent strictly construed exception to the otherwise liberally construed constitutional rule of homestead exemption from forced sale, that a lien created pursuant to s 162.09, F.S. is not enforceable against homestead property by foreclosure of such lien where the owner of such property successfully asserts the property's homestead status as a defense to foreclosure or by way of petition to a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin a forced sale, see, ss 222.01, 222.02, 222.08 and 222.09, F.S., and that a code enforcement board stands in the shoes of any other judgment creditor with respect to forcing a sale of homestead property pursuant to foreclosure.

In sum, then, and unless and until judicially determined otherwise, it is my opinion that a lien created by s 162.09, F.S., is not enforceable against homestead property by foreclosure of such lien where the owner of such property successfully asserts the property's homestead status as a defense to foreclosure or by way of petition to a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin a forced sale, and that a code enforcement board stands in the shoes of any other judgment creditor with respect to forcing a sale of homestead property pursuant to foreclosure, since a lien created pursuant to s 162.09 is neither a 'tax' nor an 'assessment' within the strictly construed exceptions to the liberally construed constitutional rule of homestead exemption from forced sale.

Sincerely,

Jim Smith
Attorney General

Prepared by:

Kent L. Weissinger
Assistant Attorney General

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

618 So. 2d 754, 18 Fla. Law W. D, 1122 DEMURA v. COUNTY OF VOLUSIA
(Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1993)

618 So. 2d 754, 18 Fla. Law W. D, 1122 DEMURA V. COUNTY OF VOLUSIA JOSEPH A. DEMURA and DIANE L. DEMURA, Appellants,
vs.
COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, a political subdivision of the State of
Florida, Appellee.
CASE No. 92-2232
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIFTH DISTRICT
618 So. 2d 754, 18 Fla. Law W. D 1122
April 30, 1993, Filed
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County, C. McFerrin Smith, III, Judge.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1993.
COUNSEL
Howard L. Cauvel of Rano, Cauvel, Johnson & Ceely, P.A., DeLand, for Appellants.
Steven J. Guardiano and T. I. Harris, Assistant Volusia County Attorneys, DeLand, for Appellee.
JUDGES
COBB, HARRIS, GRIFFIN
AUTHOR: COBB
OPINION
COBB, J.
The appellants Joseph A. Demura and Diane L. Demura, appeal the dismissal of their quiet title action against the County of Volusia. The action sought to remove a cloud from the title of real property which the Demuras claimed as homestead, the alleged cloud being a judgment lien against the Demuras personally, claimed by Volusia County pursuant to an "Order Imposing Fine-Lien." The fine had been imposed by the County against the Demuras because of noncompliance with an order of the County Code Enforcement Board.
The County moved to dismiss the Demuras' action on the basis that there was no contention that it had sought to foreclose the lien. The County argued that Article X, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Florida does not extinguish liens, but merely prohibits forced sale of property while it is homestead. Pursuant to the County's motion, the trial court entered the following order of dismissal:
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE came on for hearing and argument of counsel for both parties on the Motion to Dismiss of the Defendant, COUNTY OF VOLUSIA. The Court finds the Defendant COUNTY has not sought to foreclose its Code Enforcement Board lien on the homestead real property of the Plaintiff, and accordingly, neither the statutory nor constitutional prohibitions of Sec. 162.09(3), Florida Statutes, and Art. X, § 4(a), Fla. Const., against foreclosure of liens on homestead real property apply in the instant case. It is clear that the statutory and constitutional prohibitions relate solely to foreclosure and not to the creation of a lien.

The Court bases its finding upon the authority of Point East One Condominium v. Point East Developers, Inc., 348 So.2d 32 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977), as cited in 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 85-26 (March 26, 1985), and further finds that the lien in the instant case remains valid as to the Plaintiff's homestead real property and to any purchasers of said real property, who would be on notice as to the recorded Volusia County Code Enforcement line. It is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant COUNTY OF VOLUSIA'S Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted, and this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

The statements of law in the order of dismissal are clearly contrary to the constitutional law of Florida. Article X, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Florida provides in pertinent part:
(a). There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by the natural person:

(1) a homestead, . . .; (Emphasis added).

Section 162, Florida Statutes (1991), governs local Code Enforcement Boards, giving these boards the power to "impose administrative fines and other noncriminal penalties to provide an equitable, expeditious, effective and inexpensive method of enforcing any codes and ordinances in force in counties and municipalities, where a pending or repeated violation exists." § 162.02, Fla. Stat. (1991).
Section 162.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in pertinent part:
A certified copy of an order imposing a fine may be recorded in the public records and thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator. Upon petition to the circuit court, such order may be enforced in the same manner as a court judgment by the sheriffs of this state, including levy against personal property, but such order shall not be deemed to be a court judgment except for enforcement purposes. A fine imposed pursuant to this part shall continue to accrue until the violator comes into compliance or until judgment is rendered in a suit to foreclose on a lien filed pursuant to this section, whichever comes first. After three months from the filing of any such lien which remains unpaid, the enforcement board may authorize the local governing body attorney to foreclose on the lien. No lien created pursuant to the provision of this part may be foreclosed on real property which is a homestead under s. 4 Art. X of the State Constitution.

Although the statute merely provides that any lien created pursuant to an administrative fine may not be foreclosed on real property which is homestead, the Constitution itself goes much farther: No such lien exists as to such homestead property. Since that is true, the mere recording of the order against the Demuras cannot constitute a cloud against their homestead property. It is arguable that the action which the Demuras should have filed (assuming, arguendo, that any action at all was necessary) was a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the property at issue is, in fact, homestead property at this time. It may very well be, however, that the homestead status of the property is not in factual dispute.
We note that if the property is, indeed, homestead property, then the Demuras may sell it and, contrary to the finding by the trial court, there would be no lien on the property then in the hands of the purchasers. On the other hand, if the Demuras failed to invest the proceeds of that sale into another homestead within a reasonable period of time, those proceeds could be reached by creditors such as the County. See, e.g., Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating Company v. LaCroix, 137 So.2d 201, 206 (Fla. 1962). It is also true, of course, that if the Demuras were to retain ownership of the property but abandoned it as their homestead, the County's order against them could then be enforced as a lien against the property.
Accordingly, we quash the order of dismissal entered by the trial judge in this case because of its erroneous statements of law and the cloud upon the title of the appellants' homestead, if in fact it is homestead, created by the order of dismissal itself. We agree, however, that a quiet title suit will not lie and the action below will be subject to final dismissal absent an appropriate amendment of the cause by the Demuras.
JUDGMENT QUASHED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
DISPOSITION

JUDGMENT QUASHED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

MARTIN C. MISKIN, Appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA, a municipal
corporation, Appellee.
CASE No. 94-3618.
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FOURTH DISTRICT
661 So. 2d 415, 20 Fla. Law W. D 2345
October 18, 1995, Filed
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Broward County, Miette K. Burnstein, Judge. L.T. CASE NO. 94-00427-21 CACE.
Released for Publication November 3, 1995.
COUNSEL
James P. Durkin, Pompano Beach, for appellant.
Dennis E. Lyles, City Attorney, and Lindsey A. Payne and Paula C. Tighe, Assistant City Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
JUDGES
GUNTHER, C.J., DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
AUTHOR: GUNTHER
OPINION
GUNTHER, C.J.
Appellant, Martin C. Miskin, plaintiff below (Miskin), appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of the appellee, the City of Fort Lauderdale (the City). We affirm.
On September 19, 1991, Miskin was issued a notice of violation by the City for two code violations pertaining to his homestead property located in Fort Lauderdale. Subsequently, the code enforcement board found in favor of the City and issued a final order requiring Miskin to alleviate the problems by January 26, 1992, or be subject to a $ 150.00 fine per day each day the violations exist. Eventually, the City recorded the order as a lien in the public records pursuant to section 162.09, Florida Statutes (1993).
Thereafter, on January 13, 1994, Miskin filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a court decree that the code violation order did not exist as a lien against his homestead property. The City then moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted finding
[the] City's code enforcement board lien is not invalidated. However, pursuant to section 4, Article X, Florida Constitution, as long as Plaintiff's property maintains its homestead status and is not abandoned by Plaintiff or is not sold with the proceeds of such sale not being invested in another homestead property, [the] City may not foreclose its code enforcement board lien against Plaintiff's homestead property.

Chapter 162, Florida Statutes (1993), provides local code enforcement boards with the authority to "impose administrative fines and other noncriminal penalties to provide an equitable, expeditious, effective and inexpensive method of enforcing any codes and ordinances in force in counties and municipalities." § 162.02, Fla. Stat. (1993). Specifically, section 162.09(3) provides:
A certified copy of an order imposing a fine may be recorded in the public record and thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator. Upon petition to the circuit court, such order may be enforced in the same manner as a court judgment by the sheriffs of this state, including levy against the personal property, but such order shall not be deemed to be a court judgment except for enforcement purposes ... No lien created pursuant to the provisions of this part may be foreclosed on real property which is homestead under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution.

Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution provides:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:

(1) a homestead ....

Initially, it must be noted that the instant lien was created pursuant to a code enforcement board order rather than pursuant to a "judgment, decree or execution" which are prohibited by the constitution. Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. More importantly, contrary to Miskin's assertion, the prohibition of the constitutional provision is a prohibition against the use of process to force sale of homestead property and does not invalidate the debt or lien. Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912); Point East One Condominium Corp., Inc. v. Point East Developers, Inc., 348 So.2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Daniels v. Katz, 237 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Thus, the constitutional prohibition takes priority over the debt or lien and renders the same unenforceable. Point East One Condominium Corp., Inc., 348 So.2d at 36; Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 85-26 (1985). The legislature recognized this fact in determining that an enforcement board order should not be considered a judgment except for enforcement proceedings. § 169.09(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). Accordingly, the mere recording of the order in the instant case does not constitute a cloud upon Miskin's homestead property. Demura v. County of Volusia, 618 So.2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). However, if Miskin's property somehow lost its homestead status, the City would be able to enforce the order as a lien against the property. Id.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the Florida Constitution did not invalidate the lien created in the instant case but merely rendered the same unenforceable. As such, the summary judgment granted in favor of the City is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
DISPOSITION

AFFIRMED.

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

Anthony,

I hope these responses answer your question...

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com

John Sims, You are the Man!

I read just about all that before in the $25 packet you sent me was all the case law. I live in Ft Lauderdale and I like pretty little white flowers, and I have a 600 pound tire I like to flip in my backyard.Code Enforcement wanted it gone , but the Inspector became very agitated at the mention of Article 10 section 4...and then we settled on me covering it with a tarp.

But just to clarify:
The language that states the lien is against " the property upon which the violation exists AND upon any real or personal property of the violator"
Now I know somewhere it is written that $1000 of personal property is also "homestead protected". But the question still remains as to how this works.

Ok, are you saying that since my homestead property is the lein's target therefore the lein is not foreclosable so they cant get any "personal property of the violator" either?

Thanks, as always , you have gone above and beyond, and I will continue to encourage others to use your service as I have in the past.

JESUS IS LORD

Thanks Anthony! You are correct.

http://www.floridahomesteadservices.com