"Every court, whether possessed of original or appellate jurisdiction, is vested with inherent power to vacate its own orders, judgments, or decrees, if void, and indeed, every such court is in duty bound to do so when appropriate procedure is invoked for that purpose." Skipper v. Schumacher, 118 Fla. 867, 160 So. 357, 359 (Fla. 1935); see also 13 Fla. Jur. 2d Courts and Judges § 16 (1979). Moreover, "orders, decrees, or judgments, procured through fraud, collusion, deceit, or mistake, may be opened, vacated, or modified at any time, on the proper showing made by the parties injured." Zemurray v. Kilgore, 130 Fla. 317, 177 So. 714, 718 (Fla. 1937).
In George Vining & Sons, Inc. v. Jones, 498 So.2d 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), the parties to a breach of contract action settled by substituting a new agreement for the contract in litigation. The trial court entered a final judgment approving the settlement stipulation. When a dispute developed over performance of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff filed a petition in the former breach of contract action seeking to enforce the final judgment, alleging that the defendant had failed to perform according to the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the motion to enforce. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, holding that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter such an order, reversed and stated:
If the plaintiff accepted the new stipulated agreement in lieu of her cause of action for money damages for breach of the old agreement, then the acceptance of the new agreement would have accomplished an accord and satisfaction of her cause of action on the old contract, which was the subject of the pending law action, and would have ended that action and cause. If so, that action should have been dismissed. If and when the defendant breached the new agreement a new cause of action came into existence and the plaintiff should have instituted a new law action for money damages for breach of the new agreement.
Id. at 697-98; see also, Wallace v. Townsell, 471 So.2d 662, 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)("If the settlement agreement was breached that matter should have been the subject of a separate action in which one of the parties pleaded a cause of action based on the settlement agreement and the other pleaded any legal defense to the asserted cause of action").
Similarly, in Jared v. Jackson, 483 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), the Fourth District, granting a petition for writ of certiorari, held that the trial court had no "jurisdiction to enforce a settlement entered into after a final judgment has been rendered and become final for all purposes." Id. at 52
Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1982) (once appellate court has jurisdiction it may, if it finds necessary to do so, consider any item that may affect the case); Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Kropff, 491 So.2d 1252, 1254 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (sovereign immunity relates to subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time).
29 Fla. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 44 for the principle that a court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of crime.
GERALD WALTERS, et al., Appellants,
AQUATIC SENSORS CORPORATION, Appellee.
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT
633 So. 2d 475, 19 Fla. Law W. D 371
After a foreign judgment has been duly filed, the grounds for reopening or vacating it are limited to lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in the procurement (extrinsic), satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that make a judgment invalid or unenforceable. (Emphasis added).
Matson v. Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1983).